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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1883
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ELOISE ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.,
PETITIONERS v. VERNA EDWARDS, etc., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 22, 1995]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case presents the question whether federal law
governing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program prohibits States from grouping into a
single AFDC -assistance unit- all needy children who
live in the same household under the care of one rela-
tive.  Such grouping allows States to grant equal assis-
tance to equally sized needy households, regardless of
whether the children in the household are all siblings.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that federal law forbids States to equalize assistance in
this manner.  We disagree and accordingly reverse.

                      I
  AFDC is a joint federal-state public assistance pro-
gram authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security
Act, 49 Stat. 627, 42 U. S. C. 601 et seq.  As its name
indicates, the AFDC program -is designed to provide
financial assistance to needy dependent children and the
parents or relatives who live with and care for them.-
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974).  The pro-
gram -reimburses each State which chooses to partici-
pate with a percentage of the funds it expends,- so long
as the State -administer[s] its assistance program pur-
suant to a state plan that conforms to applicable federal
statutes and regulations.-  Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S.
184, 189 (1985) (citing 42 U. S. C. 602, 603).
  One applicable federal rule requires state plans to pro-
vide that all members of a nuclear family who live in
the same household must apply for AFDC assistance if
any one of them applies; in addition, the income of all
of these applicants must be aggregated in determining
their eligibility and the amount of their monthly bene-
fits.  See 42 U. S. C. 602(a)(38) (1988 ed., Supp. V); 45
CFR 206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1993).  See generally Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U. S. 587 (1987) (upholding rule against
constitutional challenges).  This -family filing unit rule-
requires that all cohabiting nuclear family members be
grouped into a single AFDC -assistance unit- (AU), de-
fined by federal law as -the group of individuals whose
income, resources and needs are considered as a unit for
purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of
payment.-  45 CFR 206.10(b)(5) (1993).  The regulation
at issue in this case-California's -non-sibling filing unit
rule- (California Rule)-goes even further in this regard.
It provides: -Two or more AUs in the same home shall
be combined into one AU when . . . [t]here is only one
[adult] caretaker relative.-  Cal. Dept. of Social Servs.,
Manual of Policies & Procedures 82-824.1.13, App. to
Pet. for Cert. 52.  In other words, the California Rule
groups into a single AU all needy children who live in
the same household, whether or not they are siblings, if
there is only one adult caring for all of them.
  The consolidation of two or more AU's into a single
AU pursuant to the California Rule results in a decrease
in the maximum per capita AFDC benefits for which the
affected individuals are eligible.  This occurs because
while California (like many States) increases the amount
of assistance for each additional person added to an AU,
the increase is not proportional.  Thus, as the number
of persons in the AU increases, the per capita payment
to the AU decreases.  See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471, 473-474 (1970) (sustaining a Maryland
AFDC regulation under which -the standard of need in-
creases with each additional person in the household,
but the increments become proportionately smaller-).
  The situation of respondent Verna Edwards and her
relatives illustrates the operation of these two rules.
Initially, Mrs. Edwards received AFDC assistance on
behalf of her granddaughter, for whom she is the sole
caretaker.  As a one-person AU, the granddaughter was
eligible to receive a -maximum aid payment- of $341 per
month prior to September 1991.  See n. 1, supra.  Later,
Mrs. Edwards began caring for her two grandnieces, who
are siblings.  Pursuant to the federal family filing unit
rule, the grandnieces are grouped together in a two-
person AU, which was eligible to receive $560 per month
in benefits prior to September 1991.  See ibid.  Because
none of these children received any outside income, Mrs.
Edwards received $901 per month in AFDC assistance
on behalf of the three girls.  In June 1991, however,
Mrs. Edwards received notice that pursuant to the Cal-
ifornia Rule, her granddaughter and two grandnieces
would be grouped together into a single three-person
AU, which was eligible to receive only $694 per month.
See ibid.  The California Rule thus reduced AFDC pay-
ments to the Edwards household by $207 per month.
  On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Mrs. Edwards, her three relatives, and other respondents
brought this action against petitioners, the state officials
charged with administering California's AFDC program,
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Califor-
nia.  Pursuant to Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U. S. C. 1983,
respondents sought a declaration that the California
Rule violates federal law and an injunction prohibiting
petitioners from enforcing it.  On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the District Court granted the requested
relief.  It found the California Rule indistinguishable in
relevant respects from the Washington regulation invali-
dated in Beaton v. Thompson, 913 F. 2d 701 (CA9 1990).
  In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.  It found the California Rule -virtually
identical- to the Washington regulation that Beaton had
held to be -inconsistent with federal law and regulation.-
Edwards v. Healy, 12 F. 3d 154, 155 (1993).  Since the
Court of Appeals issued its decision, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)-which administers
the AFDC program on the federal level-determined that
its own AFDC regulations -do not conflict with the State
policy option to consolidate assistance units in the same
household.-  Transmittal No. ACF-AT-94-6 (Mar. 16,
1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. 37.  Moreover, a number of
federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort
have recently issued rulings at odds with the decision
below.  We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict,
and we now reverse.

                     II
  In Beaton, the Ninth Circuit ruled that grouping into
the same AU all needy children (both siblings and non-
siblings alike) who live in the same household is incon-
sistent with three different federal AFDC regulations,
namely, 45 CFR 233.20(a)(2)(viii), 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D),
and 233.90(a)(1) (1993).  See Beaton, supra, at 704.
Respondents rely principally on these three regulations
in their submission here.
  As we examine the regulations, we keep in mind that
in AFDC cases, -the starting point of the . . . analysis
must be a recognition that . . . federal law gives each
State great latitude in dispensing its available funds.-
Dandridge, 397 U. S., at 478.  Accord, Shea, 416 U. S.,
at 253 (States -are given broad discretion in determining
both the standard of need and the level of benefits-).  In
light of this cardinal principle, we conclude that the fed-
eral regulations do not preclude the adoption of the Cal-
ifornia Rule.

                      A
  According to 233.20(a)(2)(viii), States may not reduce
the amount of assistance for which AFDC applicants are
eligible -solely because of the presence in the household
of a non-legally responsible individual.-  Using the ex-
ample of Mrs. Edwards and her relatives, respondents
observe that although the granddaughter received AFDC
benefits of $341 per month before the two grandnieces
came to live in Mrs. Edwards' household, she received
only one-third of $694, or $231.33, per month after the
grandnieces arrived and the California Rule took effect.
See Brief for Respondents 6, 22.  This reduction in the
granddaughter's per capita benefits occurred, according
to respondents, -solely because of the presence in the
household of- the grandnieces, who are -non-legally re-
sponsible individual[s]- in relation to the granddaughter.
  Respondents are simply wrong.  It was not solely the
presence of the grandnieces that triggered the decline in
per capita benefits paid to the granddaughter; rather, it
was the grandnieces' presence plus their application for
AFDC assistance through Mrs. Edwards.  Had the two
grandnieces, after coming to live in Mrs. Edwards' home,
either not applied for assistance or applied through a
different caretaker relative living in that home, the Cal-
ifornia Rule would not have affected the granddaughter's
benefits at all.

                      B
  Respondents also argue that the California Rule vio-
lates the -availability- principle, which is implemented,
in one form or another, by all three federal regulations.
Section 233.90(a)(1) provides that -the inclusion in the
family, or the presence in the home, of a `substitute par-
ent' or `man-in-the-house' or any individual other than
[the child's parent] is not an acceptable basis for . . .
assuming the availability of income- to a needy child.
Likewise, 233.20(a)(2)(viii) provides that States may
-not assume any contribution from [a non-legally respon-
sible] individual for the support of the assistance unit.-
Finally, 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) provides generally that States
shall, -in determining need and the amount of the assis-
tance payment,- count only -[i]ncome . . . and resources
available for current use-; the regulation adds that -in-
come and resources are considered available both when
actually available and when [legally available].-
  According to respondents, the California Rule assumes
that income from relatives is contributed to, or otherwise
available to, a needy child without a determination that
it is actually available.  If Mrs. Edwards' granddaughter
were to begin receiving $75 per month in outside in-
come, for example, the AU of which she is a part would
receive $75 less in monthly AFDC benefits, and the two
grandnieces would each accordingly receive $25 less in
per capita monthly benefits.  Thus, the California Rule
assertedly -assumes,- in violation of all three federal
regulations, that the granddaughter will contribute $25
per month of her outside income to each grandniece and
also that such income will therefore be available to each
grandniece-without a case-specific determination that
such contribution will in fact occur.
  Respondents' argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, its premise is questionable.  Although in this ex-
ample, the grandnieces each will nominally receive $25
less in per capita monthly benefits, they will actually
receive less in benefits only if one assumes that Mrs.
Edwards will expend an equal amount of AFDC assis-
tance on each of the three children-without regard to
any other relevant circumstances, such as whether one
of them receives outside income.  Not only would such
assumption fail to reflect reality, see, e.g., Gilliard, 483
U. S., at 600, n. 14, it would also be inconsistent with
the duty imposed on caretakers by federal law to spend
AFDC payments -in the best interests of the child[ren]-
for whom they care, 42 U. S. C. 605, a duty specifically
implemented by California law, see, e.g., Cal. Welf. &
Inst. Code Ann. 11005.5, 11480 (West 1991).  Thus,
California may rationally assume that a caretaker will
observe her duties to all the members of the AU and
will take into account the receipt of any outside income
by one child when expending funds on behalf of the AU.
  Second, respondents' argument misperceives the oper-
ation of the California Rule.  In the foregoing example,
California would simply add the monthly income of all
members of the AU-$75 (granddaughter) plus $0 (first
grandniece) plus $0 (second grandniece) for a total of
$75-and reduce the monthly assistance payment to the
Edwards family AU accordingly.  It should be clear from
this example that the monthly payment to the AU is re-
duced not because the California Rule -assumes- that
any income is available to the grandnieces, but because
it places the two grandnieces into the same AU as the
granddaughter (whose income is actually available to
herself).  What respondents are really attacking is the
rule that the income of all members of the AU is com-
bined in order to determine the amount of the assistance
payment to the AU.  This attack ignores the very defi-
nition of an AU: the group of individuals whose income
and resources are considered -as a unit- for purposes of
determining the amount of the assistance payment.  45
CFR 206.10(b)(5) (1993).  Accord, Brief for Respondents
4 (-All of the income and resources of everyone in the
assistance unit are taken into consideration in establish-
ing the benefit payment-).
  Perhaps respondents are arguing that the regulations
simply forbid California to combine the incomes of all
needy children in a household-whether by grouping
them into the same AU or otherwise.  But whatever are
the limits that federal law imposes on States' authority
in this regard, the combination of incomes effected by
the California Rule is authorized by the AFDC statute
itself, which provides that a state agency -shall, in de-
termining need, take into consideration any . . . income
and resources of any child or relative claiming [AFDC
assistance].-  42 U. S. C. 602(a)(7)(A) (1988 ed. and
Supp. V).  In light of the -great latitude,- Dandridge,
397 U. S., at 478, and the -broad discretion,- Shea, 416
U. S., at 253, that States have in administering their
AFDC programs, this statute is reasonably construed to
allow States, in determining a child's need (and there-
fore how much assistance she will receive), to take into
consideration the income and resources of all cohabiting
children and relatives also claiming AFDC assistance.
  The availability regulations are addressed to an en-
tirely different problem, namely, the counting of income
and resources controlled by persons outside the AU for
the purpose of determining the amount of assistance to
be provided to the AU.  The regulations were adopted to
implement our decisions in three AFDC cases.  See 42
Fed. Reg. 6583-6584 (1977) (citing King v. Smith, 392
U. S. 309 (1968); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U. S. 552 (1970);
Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975)).  In all three
cases, the State had counted as available to the AU in-
come that was not actually or legally available because
it was controlled by a person who was not a member of
the AU and who was not applying for AFDC assistance.
See King, supra, at 311 (a -`substitute father,'- defined
as any able-bodied man who cohabited with the mother
of the needy children in or outside her home); Lewis,
supra, at 554 (-an adult male person assuming the role
of spouse to the mother,- such as a common-law hus-
band, or a nonadopting stepfather not legally obligated
to support the children); Van Lare, supra, at 339, 340 (a
-nonpaying lodge[r],- who was -a person not a recipient
of AFDC-).  Accord, Bray v. Dowling, 25 F. 3d 135, 144
(CA2 1994) (The federal availability regulations -were
established to address specific concerns regarding the
imputation of income from non-AFDC sources-), cert.
pending, No. 94-5845.
  The California Rule has no such effect.  The combined
income of the three-person AU comprising the grand-
daughter and two grandnieces of Mrs Edwards is not
calculated with reference to the income either of Mrs.
Edwards herself or of anyone else inside or outside the
Edwards household who is not a member of the AU and
who is not applying for AFDC assistance.  In sum, the
California Rule does not violate any of the three federal
regulations on which the Court of Appeals relied.

                     III
  Respondents offer two alternative grounds to support
the judgment below.  Neither has merit, and we may
dispose of them quickly.
  First, respondents argue that the California Rule is
an invalid expansion of the family filing unit rule, 42
U. S. C. 602(a)(38).  According to respondents, when
Congress decreed that all members of a nuclear family
must be grouped together in a single AU, it intended to
prevent States from including any additional persons in
that AU (as does the California Rule).  We reject the
notion that Congress' directive regarding the composition
of assistance units -occupied the field- and thereby pre-
empted States from adopting any additional rules touch-
ing this area.  What we said about -workfare- in New
York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S.
405, 414 (1973), applies here as well: -If Congress had
intended to pre-empt state plans and efforts in such an
important dimension of the AFDC program . . . , such
intentions would in all likelihood have been expressed
in direct and unambiguous language.-  The language of
602(a)(38) requires States to embrace the family filing
unit rule; it does not further limit States' discretion in
a direct or unambiguous manner.
  Second, respondents argue that the California Rule
violates two other federal regulations that require equi-
table treatment among AFDC recipients.  See 45 CFR
233.10(a)(1) (1993) (-the eligibility conditions imposed
. . . must not result in inequitable treatment of individ-
uals or groups-); 233.20(a)(1)(i) (-the determination of
need and amount of assistance for all applicants [must]
be made on an objective and equitable basis-).  Assum-
ing that these provisions even -creat[e] a `federal right'
that is enforceable under [42 U. S. C.] 1983,- Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 509 (1990), we
find that the California Rule affirmatively fosters equi-
table treatment among AFDC recipients.
  For example, prior to September 1991 a caretaker rel-
ative responsible for three brothers having no outside
income would have received AFDC benefits of $694 per
month on their behalf.  Yet before the California Rule
was applied to her household, Mrs. Edwards received
monthly benefits of $901 for the three girls for whom
she cared.  See supra, at 4.  The $207 difference is due
solely to the fact that in one household all of the chil-
dren are siblings, while in the other they are not.  The
potential inequities in the absence of the California Rule
are even greater.  Six needy siblings living in the same
household in California could have received up to $1057
per month in benefits before September 1991.  But prior
to the California Rule's adoption, six needy non-siblings
who lived in the same household could have received as
much as $2046, or almost double.  See n. 1, supra.  The
California Rule sensibly and equitably eliminates these
disparities by providing that equally sized and equally
needy households will receive equal AFDC assistance.
Thus, the rule does not violate the equitable treatment
regulations.
                 *    *    *
  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Cal-
ifornia Rule does not violate federal law.  Accordingly,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                            It is so ordered.